Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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... concept is such that , as in the Aristotelian concept , a species is fixed . Species are Lockean nominal essences . The issue is whether a fixed species is exemplified in any actual population . In contemporary biology -- unlike the ...
... concept is such that , as in the Aristotelian concept , a species is fixed . Species are Lockean nominal essences . The issue is whether a fixed species is exemplified in any actual population . In contemporary biology -- unlike the ...
Página 302
... concept occurs when an individual man makes a change , small or large , to his individual concept . The variation then , is propagated through a population of concepts , which now must be considered to be individuated by reference to ...
... concept occurs when an individual man makes a change , small or large , to his individual concept . The variation then , is propagated through a population of concepts , which now must be considered to be individuated by reference to ...
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... concept and that first level concept itself falls under a second level concept , then surely it is not impossible that the object should also fall under the second level concept . This of course would prove too much , since it would ...
... concept and that first level concept itself falls under a second level concept , then surely it is not impossible that the object should also fall under the second level concept . This of course would prove too much , since it would ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York