Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 8
... clear that these lesser claims just will not do . Premise ( 2b ) is an example of the sort of view Frankena calls ' internalism ' in his article ' Obligation and Motiva- tion in Recent Moral Philosophy'.2 Internalism is to be contrasted ...
... clear that these lesser claims just will not do . Premise ( 2b ) is an example of the sort of view Frankena calls ' internalism ' in his article ' Obligation and Motiva- tion in Recent Moral Philosophy'.2 Internalism is to be contrasted ...
Página 343
... clearly inapplicable to kinds , but say that it is not clear that all are . Could not ' exists ' be unique in this respect ? Such an objection may rest on the view that if an object falls under a first level concept and that first level ...
... clearly inapplicable to kinds , but say that it is not clear that all are . Could not ' exists ' be unique in this respect ? Such an objection may rest on the view that if an object falls under a first level concept and that first level ...
Página 426
... clear that the discovery of a green emerald confirms that statement rather better than would the production of a red ruby . But since a red ruby is a non - green non - emerald , it confirms ' All non - green things are non - emeralds ...
... clear that the discovery of a green emerald confirms that statement rather better than would the production of a red ruby . But since a red ruby is a non - green non - emerald , it confirms ' All non - green things are non - emeralds ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York