Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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... cause an action is not to say it is logically necessary that it not be a cause . There is a logically possible world where sparks do not cause explosions . It does not follow that there is no logically possible world where a spark causes ...
... cause an action is not to say it is logically necessary that it not be a cause . There is a logically possible world where sparks do not cause explosions . It does not follow that there is no logically possible world where a spark causes ...
Página 214
a cause that it is independently identifiable from the effect . Second , surely causes must precede effects . But , against the first argument it might be held that this is a condition for identifying causes and effects , not a ...
a cause that it is independently identifiable from the effect . Second , surely causes must precede effects . But , against the first argument it might be held that this is a condition for identifying causes and effects , not a ...
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... cause must be the whole cause of its effect , or no cause at all . This is evident from his claim that to avoid the anti - interactionist impli- cations of physiology one must adopt the ' incoherent idea ' of ' Double Causation ...
... cause must be the whole cause of its effect , or no cause at all . This is evident from his claim that to avoid the anti - interactionist impli- cations of physiology one must adopt the ' incoherent idea ' of ' Double Causation ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York