Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 115
... analytic ' in terms of ' analytic in ' is circular . Quine does say just this : ' Now here the difficulty is simply that the rules contain the word ' analytic ' , which we do not understand ' ( TD , 33 ) . Defining a predicate ' P ' in ...
... analytic ' in terms of ' analytic in ' is circular . Quine does say just this : ' Now here the difficulty is simply that the rules contain the word ' analytic ' , which we do not understand ' ( TD , 33 ) . Defining a predicate ' P ' in ...
Página 231
... analytic if and only if its negation is incoherent . Now whether a proposi- tion is coherent or incoherent is solely a matter of what it says— the fact that it says what it does , is alone sufficient to make it co- herent , or ...
... analytic if and only if its negation is incoherent . Now whether a proposi- tion is coherent or incoherent is solely a matter of what it says— the fact that it says what it does , is alone sufficient to make it co- herent , or ...
Página 242
... analytic , not all such proposi- tions are a priori . However all a priori propositions are analytic . All analytic propositions are necessary in senses ( C ) and ( E ) ( and tensed analytic propositions are necessary in sense ( D ) ...
... analytic , not all such proposi- tions are a priori . However all a priori propositions are analytic . All analytic propositions are necessary in senses ( C ) and ( E ) ( and tensed analytic propositions are necessary in sense ( D ) ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York