Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 279
... action which consists in deliberately not winning for the fiftieth time in this sort of contest is a kind of action which never has been and never will be performed . Yet we want to say that its per- formance lay within Koltanovsky's ...
... action which consists in deliberately not winning for the fiftieth time in this sort of contest is a kind of action which never has been and never will be performed . Yet we want to say that its per- formance lay within Koltanovsky's ...
Página 305
... action and knowledge are : the basic powers of action , e.g. over our arm but not our heart , and the basic cognitive powers , e.g. to hear sonically but not super - sonically ; the impossibility of failure in both basic acts and basic ...
... action and knowledge are : the basic powers of action , e.g. over our arm but not our heart , and the basic cognitive powers , e.g. to hear sonically but not super - sonically ; the impossibility of failure in both basic acts and basic ...
Página 306
of actions and does not ask himself whether there is any difference either between the categories signified by ' do ' , ' act ' and ' action ' or between acts and other kinds of episodes . Intertwined with all this is , I think , the ...
of actions and does not ask himself whether there is any difference either between the categories signified by ' do ' , ' act ' and ' action ' or between acts and other kinds of episodes . Intertwined with all this is , I think , the ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York