Mind, Volume 84Oxford University Press, 1975 Issues for 1896-1900 contain papers of the Aristotelian Society. |
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Página 610
... accept Z until you had forced me to take the very necessary step of accepting : ( C ) If A and B are true , then Z must be true . ' ' But you then accepted C. ' ' Not exactly . I pointed out that I could accept A and B and C without ...
... accept Z until you had forced me to take the very necessary step of accepting : ( C ) If A and B are true , then Z must be true . ' ' But you then accepted C. ' ' Not exactly . I pointed out that I could accept A and B and C without ...
Página 611
... accept A and B and you accept that A and B entail Z , then you are rationally obliged to accept Z. ' ' Ah , you propose to appeal to my sense of honour , ' the Tortoise replied . ' I fear I'm too much of a scoundrel to accept my ...
... accept A and B and you accept that A and B entail Z , then you are rationally obliged to accept Z. ' ' Ah , you propose to appeal to my sense of honour , ' the Tortoise replied . ' I fear I'm too much of a scoundrel to accept my ...
Página 614
... accept that there are necessary truths . ( Although you accepted A and B only for purposes of argument , you accepted absolutely that , if you were to accept C , you would have to accept Z , denying only that this obliged you accept Z. ) ...
... accept that there are necessary truths . ( Although you accepted A and B only for purposes of argument , you accepted absolutely that , if you were to accept C , you would have to accept Z , denying only that this obliged you accept Z. ) ...
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accept action analysis analytic analytic propositions argued argument Aristotle assert Avenue basic behaviour believe Canada causal claim class abstracts College colour concept conclusion criteria criticism death decision definition Department of Philosophy discussion distinction doctrine Edited entails entities epistemology essay example existence explained expression fact false feeling Frege Geach Heidegger human individual induction inference intuition involved Jonathan Bennett kind knowledge language language-game logical London matter means mind moral nature necessary notion numerical identity object ostensive definition Oxford P. F. Strawson pain paradox particular person Philosophy Department Philosophy of Science physical position possible precise predicate principle problem Prof proper names properties proposition question rational reference relation relevant Road RTCP rules rules of inference seems semantic sense sentence simply Socrates spatial statement suggest suppose temporal theory thesis things tion true truth veil of perception Wittgenstein York