ISAAC A. HOURWICH: The economist cannot decline to give a scientific definition of socialism. Socialism has had a history going back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. There are said to be ten million socialist voters in the world. Surely it would be a confession of impotence on the part of political economy if it failed to find some definition descriptive of that phenomenon.

Such a definition, however, must not deal in mere abstractions. Socialism must be defined in the terms of evolution.

From the point of view of evolutionary socialism, the qualifying adjective "social" in the phrase "Collective ownership and operation of all social means of production" implies no contradiction. Modern socialism does not aim at the socialization of all bootblack stands. It is only those industries which have become quasi-public that are considered by the evolutionary socialist to be ripe for social control, irrespective of the question of the justice or injustice of rent, interest, etc. Our Interstate Commerce Commission, our public service commissions, our statutes for the regulation of railway rates and charges for other public utilities, are all steps in the direction of socialism. To demand of the individual manufacturer that he should disclose his books to the public would be an impertinence, because it is his private business; but we all agree upon the demand for publicity in corporate affairs.

For an answer to other objections made here to the definition which is given in the platform of the American Socialist party we must refer to the history of socialism. The adjective "democratic" is not used in contradistinction to individual enterprise, but to distinguish modern socialism from such forms of industrial organization as, for example, the communism of the Jesuit state of Uruguay, where there was public ownership and operation of all industries, yet without democratic management. The term "collective", as distinguished from "public ownership", likewise has its history. It originated in the controversy between the followers of Marx and Bakounine in the first International. Marx and his school advocated "public" ownership, whereas the disciples of Proudhon and Bakounine advocated voluntary coöperation, which they termed "collective" ownership. During the last twenty years coöperation has made great strides in agriculture, both in Europe and in the United States. The various coöperative associations in agriculture number their membership by the million. Here is an example of collective ownership and operation, which is yet not "public" ownership and operation.

DAVIS R. DEWEY: I am skeptical as to the value of attempting to define socialism. Even if the members of the Association or a similar body should agree upon such a definition, it would not be possible to secure an agreement in the world at large. In public discussion it would still be necessary to inquire specifically as to the brand of socialism under consideration in order to meet on a clearly defined issue.

F. W. TAUSSIG: In these discussions of what "socialism" implies, it seems to me odd that so much attention is given to the means, so little to the end. Collective ownership and management are but means. The end of socialism, and the essential thing for it, is a change in distribution. A change in the mechanism of production is desired not for itself but in order to substitute a distribution deemed just for one deemed unjust. I take it that under any socialistic organization all funded incomes (interest, rent, and so on) would disappear; no leisure class would exist; all the able-bodied would labor, and the only remuneration would be for labor, that is, would be wages. Wages would be adjusted on some basis thought equitable; perhaps on a basis of need, or one of sacrifice, or one of efficiency, or some combination of these; but at all events one deliberately selected as just, and surely with very much less of inequality than in existing society.

Now in deciding how far a remnant of individual ownership or competitive service might be permitted, as not inconsistent with the principles of socialism, the essential question would be whether the result was in accord with this deliberately selected canon of just distribution. Public ownership of capital per se does not necessarily modify the essentials of existing distribution; and conversely some private ownership of capital is not necessarily inconsistent with socialistic distribution. The question is, which principle of distribution dominates. When a government nowadays undertakes public management, say of a railway, it does not change the essentials of distribution. Interest is still paid to the former stockholders, who become simply public fund holders. Great disparities in wages remain; the officials and mechanical experts still get high salaries, the workmen still get wages at the familiar rates. This is not socialism, or any noticeable approach toward socialism. But if all large-scale enterprises are under public management; if interest on capital disappears; if wages are ad

justed on what is selected as the just basis; and if only such private ownership and management are allowed as bring substantially the same rates of earnings as these wages-then there would be not only an approach to socialism, but socialism in all its essentials. Physicians might be allowed to own their instruments, mechanics their tools, even small farmers ("one-family farmers”, say) their own land, if no marked divergences from the "just" scheme of distribution resulted. True, a refined analysis might detect in such cases a small infusion of return on capital; but the maxim de minimis would apply. Hence there might be some play to private ownership and some competitive activity, and yet socialism full-blown. If one looks simply to the means—public ownership-one can say there is no socialism unless there is universal public ownership. But if one looks to the end, one can say there is socialism as soon as the existing "unjust" modes of distribution are swept away, and only those competitive earnings left undisturbed which conform to the socialist principle of justice.

RICHARD T. ELY: It seems to me we are talking about two different things, although to both we are giving the one term, socialism. Most of the speakers have been talking to us about an economic program; but Professor Fetter has been talking to us about a social philosophy. Inasmuch as the definition found in my "Socialism and Social Reform" has been referred to, I think that I ought to say a few words further about my position. In my book I speak about socialism in the broader sense and in the narrower sense. By socialism in the broader sense I mean a general social philosophy; and, so far as I can gather, I define socialism in its broadest sense substantially as Professor Fetter has defined it. As a matter of fact I find socialism used in this broad sense, and something can be said in favor of employing the word to designate & certain social philosophy which is opposed to individualism. It is apt, however, to lead to confusion. My definition of socialism which has been quoted by Mr. Martin and referred to by Professor Hibbard gives, it seems to me, the essential elements in that economic program which is ordinarily called socialism. Socialism may include other elements, but any economic program to be socialism must include these. I have based my analysis on the study of the various programs of socialism in different countries where socialism is found.

JOHN MARTIN: It is, of course, competent for anybody to refuse to use any word, socialism or other. The difficulty which Professor Dewey will encounter is that he cannot blot out the word from the textbooks nor burn the libraries of volumes in which it is discussed.

I cannot follow Professor Carver in his contention that because socialists deny that interest is legitimate, because they contend that interest is not earned, they must logically demand the public ownership of absolutely all industry. The instruments of the doctor, the brushes of the painter, are tools of production, yet their owners do not collect interest on them, and their ownership by the community is not inevitably required to prevent the private appropriation of interest.

Professor Carver argues that just as vegetarianism forbids the eating of any meat so socialism forbids the use of any private ownership. Many of us had thought that, on the contrary, individualism was the exclusive political philosophy and forbade the use of any public ownership. Herbert Spencer and the Manchester School of economists declared all government interference with industry bad per se. Not until recently was I aware that individualism, in the opinion of some of its professors, is compatible with an unlimited extension of public ownership. Surely every such extension can legitimately be described as a step toward socialism. Suppose a man had eaten an exclusively meat diet. There are such carnivorous men, though I don't know of any women. Suppose a doctor recommended him to make a meal of vegetables first once a week, then once a day, and so gradually to supersede flesh with vegetables. Would he not be moving all the time towards vegetarianism, even though he never finally dropped every ounce of meat from his menu? Would the doctor be consistent, while prescribing this change of food, if he went about denouncing vegetarianism as the sum of medical villainies and a peril to the health of the citizens? If nothing is socialistic short of the complete public ownership of industry, then all the socialistic programs are only expressions of the new individualism, for no socialist program demands the immediate transfer to the community of all industry.

GOVERNMENT FACTORIES; AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL COMPETITION IN THE FUR TRADE

KATHERINE COMAN

Regulation of the Indian trade was a policy inherited from Great Britain by the seceded colonies. Indians and fur-bearing animals had been driven from the Atlantic Coast by the end of the eighteenth century, but the region beyond the Appalachians, added to British possessions in America by the Treaty of Paris, was reserved from settlement by a decree of George III with a view to maintaining peace with the native tribes and preserving the fur trade. Daniel Boone and other hunters, defying the royal decree, crossed the mountain passes that led into Ken-ta-kee, and soon settlers were pouring into the forbidden territory. The Congress of the Revolution manifested its sense of responsibility for the peace of the frontiers by forbidding (1776) persons to trade with the Indians unless licensed by the proper authorities. Ten years later, the Congress of the Confederation found time to expand this prohibition into careful regulation of the fur trade. An Indian department was established under the Secretary of War, and the deputy agents were authorized to grant licenses to citizens of the United States whose moral character was vouched for by the governor of the state to which they belonged. A bond of $5000 must be given for the observance of regulations as to the sale of liquor and firearms, while the term was limited to one year. A fee of $50 was charged for this permit, and a penalty of $500 with forfeiture of goods was imposed on unlicensed traders. These severe regulations were fied by subsequent legislation (1790, 1798, 1796, 1802). The license fee was abolished, the penalties for non-observance were lightened, and the requirement of responsible moral character lapsed. Jay's Treaty conceded to British subjects the right to secure licenses to trade within United States territory, and thus the fur trade of the Illinois Country, the prize wrenched from the British traders by Clark's Wabash expedition, was thrown open to all comers, and anarchy ran riot. In the hope of counteracting the influence of the Montreal traders, protecting the Indians from imposition on the part of our citizens, and promoting the prestige of the United States among the frontier tribes, President Washing ton proposed that government factories be established at strategic

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