essays now under discussion, the first point that strikes one's attention is a notable agreement in emphasis. They unite to lay emphasis upon Ricardo's contributions to the theories of money, of taxation and of foreign trade. The general student more frequently reads of Ricardo's doctrine of rent and of his notions concerning the measurement of value. It is notable, then, that in these centenary tributes, the finger is pointed to the more special theories-theories, in whose development, it will be observed, their author's environment and training afforded peculiar advantages. Furthermore, and equally notable, is the common emphasis of Ricardo's method of thought. Thus the great classicist's power of "mental disassociation", the "isolating power" of his mindas Dr. Hollander admirably puts it—are referred to, and we are told that his success in important departments "has been rather in method than in results." Merely noting the first point of agreement with its significant emphasis, a few words may well be added on the score of method.

I cannot think that it is intended that Ricardo's method, in the narrow sense of that term, is a peculiar one, certainly not in so far as the use of deduction is concerned. Other economists, both before and since, have reasoned in pretty much the same fashion. The peculiarity lies, first in a twofold and intense abstractness; and, secondly, in a close connection of method proper with a characteristic, though unconscious, philosophy or metaphysics. By a twofold abstractness, is meant an abstractness which, on the one hand, concerns the facts of life as they present themselves in economic phenomena, and which, on the other hand, separates the science from other sciences and arts, however closely related. In his abstractness of the former order, Ricardo displayed both the merits and the defects which are so apt to attend upon that mode of procedure. For example, most critics admit that taken as a whole his work is deficient in verification and comparison with the facts, a deficiency which is especially in evidence in his treatment of wages. Overlooking differences in work and workers and the existence of non-competitive groups, he makes such unreal assumptions concerning motives and retarding factors as almost to make the "tendencies" and "natural" wage rates deduced by their aid the exception rather than the rule. His idea of the Malthusian principle of population certainly out-Malthuses Malthus himself. In a word, extreme ab

straction bears fruit in a one-sided and incomplete wage theory.

But all the time the merit is there. Ricardo's thought was in advance of his English predecessors; in its schematic character it centered around a scheme or system, so far resembling the method of the Physiocrats. One thing comes first, then another; and all can be put in a nutshell. And this is no mean service. True it is that Ricardo's definition of concepts-like wealth and capital and land-have proved unsatisfactory; certainly his theories on rent, wages, and profits are regarded as incomplete and have been largely modified. It was not so much his originality in developing this or that point in theory which gave him. his ascendancy; he was preceded by Quesnay, Turgot, Smith, Lauderdale, and Say. But these men left no complete and consistent systems. Ricardo did. He did the abstracting for the next generation. He clinched the claim of economics to be a science by giving it a backbone. We have worked out from the Ricardian scheme of distribution and along the lines suggested, merely reducing his residual element and extending his differentials.

It is another aspect of abstractness, however, that appears in the great economist's separation of his science from such related branches as ethics and politics. J. B. Say gave clear expression to advanced ideas along this line, which may easily explain Ricardo's familiar use of such phrases as "the science of Political Economy", but he was unable to put them so effectively into practice. When one reflects upon the large place that ethical and even theological elements occupied in Adam Smith's thought, the service rendered to the growth of economics as a science is made manifest.

But all this is relatively commonplace. It is not so common to realize that much of what is often attributed to method is in reality to be traced to the underlying philosophy. In our reasoning, the philosophy and the method proper enter as tacit premises, as it were, the former-the philosophy-being the more fundamental. When one thinker reaches one conclusion and another comes to a different result, we often say, "they have different points of view", and we generally mean that their philosophies of life differ. Probably one is a materialist, the other an idealist. So it is with Ricardo. He was a materialist. As such, his philosophy was opposed to the extension of social institutions. He believed that man is more a creature of circum

stances molded by environment than a maker of his own destinies. From this philosophy, then, rather than from any peculiarity of method, flowed the greater part of such dogmas as the unqualified "principle of population", subsistence wage, equalized wages and profits, free trade, etc. In short, we are prone to lay a multitude of sins at the door of that which we call method, but which is really a complex of method and of what, for lack of a better term, may be called the philosophy.

Nor is the character of the problems which confronted him and of his class interests to be overlooked in this relation. They, too, played a part which has sometimes been confused with the method proper; for they could guide the process of abstraction and deduction.

It is in the philosophy element rather than in the use of deduction that we differ most from Ricardo. If the term realism might be used to indicate either a balancing of materialism and idealism or a superiority to either one of those philosophies, it could be said that we are more nearly realists than he. We are consequently better guarded against a one-sided application of the method proper. In the loose sense of the word, it is in this that our "methods" in pure economics most differ qualitatively from those of our predecessor.

A question has been raised concerning Ricardo's responsibility for economic radicalism. The narrow dogmatic promulgation of the labor-cost theory of value by James Mill and McCulloch is partly responsible; but, in addition to this, it seems clear to me that Ricardo did and does strongly suggest the question of injustice, and in the absolutism born of abstraction, sow the seeds of a radical reaction. "The interest of the landlord is always opposed to that of the consumer and manufacturer", well-known passage, and this idea dominates his work.

runs a

Ricardo was himself a bit of a radical. The younger Mill was led to react somewhat from him. And the true view of Marx and George will not regard them as mere reactionaries, but, in part, as correctives for a certain radical element in Ricardian thought. To be sure, religion is not responsible for the excesses of intolerance, but some creed or pope may be. And Ricardo was for a time the pope of the Political Economy Club.

The methodologically self-conscious economist of today guards against misinterpretation, and so might Ricardo have done. All writers have not been so fortunate as Ricardo in

leaving behind a mass of letters to be used in exegesis of their published work-nor so wise in the selection of their editors. One must sometimes have the feeling that a man's books, like tubs, should stand on their own bottoms.

The suggestion made by Dr. Bonar that to Ricardo economics was a science of proportions rather than of tendencies is surely an interesting one, though rendered somewhat doubtful by the latter's frequent use of the word "quantity" and the interchangeable use of "portion" and "proportion." In fact, is the idea of proportion not dependent upon that of quantity? And is not the idea of tendency necessarily implied in that of a “natural” proportion? The whole point is well illustrated by Ricardo's discussion of profits. At the margin of cultivation, the aggregate product is divided between labor and capital, and distribution between them is apparently resolved into a question of proportion. But a proportion of what amount? And how proportioned? If the aggregate amount, the wages+profits-aggregate, is not a definite and limited quantity, the idea of a proportion loses significance. If, on the other hand, the amount of the wages+profits-aggregate is partly determined by the existence of a necessary minimum of profits, the amount of that minimum must be known, for otherwise it-the minimum-could rise to any point and no limit could exist to profit's portion or proportion. But Ricardo does not consider the problem from this side; he simply takes the wages to be fixed and regards them as the determining element, that is, "the quantity of labor requisite to provide necessaries for the laborers" is the portion which determines the proportion of profits. Had he gone a little deeper into the question of quantities, his theory of profits might have been placed upon as stable a footing as his rent doctrine. He would have seen that profits, instead of depending upon wages, are independently determined in the same sense as are wages. While it does not seem to me that Ricardo always thought of mere proportions, it seems clear that his theory of profits affords an interesting illustration of such a tendency.

H. C. TAYLOR: "The effective contribution of Ricardo to economic science was not content, but method", says Professor Hollander. It is to the elucidation of this viewpoint that I wish to devote my allotted time.

Of the followers of Ricardo, some have accepted the Ricardian theory of distribution as a complete statement of the fundamentals and have devoted their time to the erection of a more lofty structure of economic philosophy based upon the Ricardian foundation. But, in accordance with Professor Hollander's suggestion, others have tried to follow Ricardo by using his method of observation and inference and proceed to a more complete study of the forces in operation in the industrial world.

When the former class of economic writers state the Ricardian theory of distribution, they are inclined to give too little attention to the accuracy of the Ricardian assumption, and often to leave off many of the modifications which Ricardo made, in order that they may get a highly unified and simple statement of economic doctrine.

Take for example the Ricardian discussion of rent. Ask any number of students of economics for Ricardo's treatment of rent and most of them will reply that according to Ricardo rent is measured in terms of the differences in the economic productivity of the land in use. More specifically, if a given farmer can secure $20 more in product for a given expenditure of labor and capital on No. 1 land than on No. 2 land, the rent of the No. 1 land will be $20 greater than the No. 2 land.

The assumptions underlying this statement are numerous. Variation in economic productivity of land is recognized and admitted by all as a fair assumption.

But this theory assumes also that all men of the class in competition for the land under consideration possess essentially the same degree of economic productivity.

The theory implies that if a given farmer can secure $20 more return for a given expenditure of labor and capital on No. 1 land than on No. 2 land, the same thing will be true of all other farmers who may be in competition for the land. But all men who observe are familiar with the fact that there is a great difference in the economic productivity of men. Where one man can produce $20 more produce per unit of labor and capital on one grade of land than on another grade, another farmer may be found who can produce no more than $10 more product per unit of labor and capital on the No. 1 land than on the No. 2 land.

The fact that the one farmer in the above illustration could equally well afford to pay $20 more for the use of the No. 1 land than for the No. 2 land is no ground for assuming