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AFTER the events of the last two years Englishmen have no excuse if they do not know things in South Africa as they really are.' Of all the many unwelcome and unexpected truths which have been burnt into the mind of England by the war, perhaps the most unwelcome is the fact that the enemy has received more or less open assistance from the country population wherever he went, with the exception of the immediate neighbourhood of the few considerable towns. This has been the case not merely in the territory of the late Republics; it was the same in Northern Natal and in the greater part of the Cape Colony. The circumstance was the more surprising in view of the small numerical superiority possessed by the Franco-Dutch population over the British colonists. Taking the European population as it was before the war broke out, we shall not be far wrong in assuming that there were then in South Africa 450,000 Dutch, 400,000 English, and 50,000 foreigners. How was it that with this small numerical superiority the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa were able, after placing 50,000 or 60,000 men in the field against the British forces, to render practically the whole of the immense area covered by the war as hostile as France or German territory would have been in the event of a British invasion? The answer is as simple as it is significant. Owing to economic and political conditions, arising in some cases out of events more than two centuries old, the Dutch population is to be found spread over karoo, veldt, and uplands, while the British is concentrated at the ports or on the mines. As the result of this distribution the Dutch have obtained a grip of the country far firmer than their mere numbers would warrant.

The material separation of the two nationalities has been accompanied by an equally marked moral separation. The natural antipathy of tastes and pursuits which distinguishes the countryman and the townsman has deepened and emphasised the original divergences of character which tended to separate the two nationalities, and prevented the amalgamation which might otherwise have taken place. Of course something has

been done during the century of British rule to obliterate race distinctions. Business relations have brought the Dutch farmers into contact with the English townsmen; and a small number of Englishmen have gone on to the land and sought a livelihood in agriculture and stock-raising. The old Dutch families in the neighbourhood of Capetown have married into the English community which has for many years been established at the seat of government. Again, more recently, when Mr. Cecil Rhodes placed young Englishmen as managers on his fruit farms in the Paarl and Stellenbosch districts, it was found that these new arrivals soon overcame the suspicions with which they were at first regarded, and in some cases intermarried with their Dutch neighbours. But in spite of these and other modifying influences the broad fact remains that up to the present the Dutch are on the land, while the English are in the towns or round the mines. The people of the two nationalities have been kept apart by this difference in their pursuits, and the separation undoubtedly contributed in no small degree to the political differences which culminated in the war. And when the struggle came, the Dutch non-combatants, being spread over practically the whole area affected by the war, were able to render effective assistance to the Boer forces, and thereby to materially increase the physical difficulties encountered by the British army. In short, the Dutch population, owing to their grip of the land, are worth much more, man for man, than the British, alike in respect of the rifle and the ballot-box.

The significance of this analysis lies in the fact that it points unmistakably to an English agricultural immigration as the most hopeful expedient for the permanent reconciliation of the Dutch and English settlers in South Africa. What is wanted is not merely fresh English immigrants. These are wanted, because (to mention one point only) the Federal Constitution which the political and economic needs of the South African colonies pre-eminently require cannot be established until there is a loyal majority. And events have shown that, unhappily, a loyal majority is almost, if not absolutely, synonymous with a British majority. The theory of the ultimate loyalty of the Afrikander population in the Cape Colony is one of those optimistic beliefs which a year of disillusionment has destroyed. What is wanted especially is an English immigration which will assist directly in the mingling of the two nationalities. For this purpose it is obvious that the kind

of British immigrants who are attracted by the industrial requirements of South Africa-the kind of immigrants who have, in fact, hitherto been supplied by England-mechanics, miners, clerks, and the like-are not sufficient. A larger British industrial population will help; but what is especially required to effect the object in question is a number of British settlers who will live on the land, mingle in the pursuits, and share the interests of the Dutch farmers, and thus break down the barrier of separation which has prevailed so long and with such disastrous results.

Before considering how settlers of this class can be provided, it will be useful to glance briefly at the British immigration of 1820, which was undertaken mainly with political ends in view. At that date the Cape was a British possession, but not a British colony. What was wanted, then as now, was a British population. In the year 1819-20 about 5,000 British immigrants were landed at Algoa Bay, and thus for the first time a considerable British population was introduced into South Africa. The determining circumstances which led to the Albany Settlement, as it was called, were these. It was felt that a British community would steady the Boers in the eastern districts of the colony. These Boers had already given proof in the Bezuidenhout rebellion of their readiness to resist the ordinances introduced by the British Government to regulate their dealings with the natives. It was also thought that these British settlers would form a natural rampart against the incursions of the Kafir tribes to which the eastern frontier of the colony was then continuously exposed. The settlement was eventually successful. It is to these Albany settlers and their descendants that we owe Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, and the present British population of the Eastern provinces in the Cape Colony. But mistakes were made which might have been avoided with advantage both to the settlers and the British Government; and a knowledge of these mistakes can scarcely fail to be of service in view of the proposal to establish the same kind of settlements with much the same political objects in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies to-day.

An instructive review of the whole circumstances of the Albany Settlement is to be found in the pages of George Thompson's Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa.' The book was published in 1827, and the author tells us that he had acquired his information in the course of eight years' residence at the Cape. The scheme, he says, was defective, but the

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propriety of the measure as a matter of policy is equally unquestionable.' He attributes the partial failure of the settlement to three causes, of which the first two have a direct bearing upon the present issue: (1) The plan of allotting only 100 acres to each family or adult male was incompatible with the character of the soil and climate;' (2) the emigrants of the class of distressed artisans from the great towns were ill adapted to the occupation of a new country.' The necessity for an ample acreage is enforced by the following passage, which throws a useful light upon the conditions necessary for successful farming in South Africa. It also reveals the fact (which is notorious) that the British Government, in its anxiety to remove any possible cause of complaint from the alien population which it was called upon to govern, placed the English settlers at a disadvantage as compared with the Dutch-a mistaken policy which has been pursued mutatis mutandis to the present day.

'It is evident that the success of the settlers has hitherto been very unequal to that of the boors (sic). If the cause were asked in Cape Town, it would be probably answered, that the difference arises from the dissimilarity of their habits; that the settlers sent out were of the wrong description; and that instead of people likely to establish themselves on farms, they appeared to consist of all the discontented artisans of the kingdom. Without examining the truth of this statement, it must be evident that no just comparison can be drawn between the success of the Dutch and English, until it is seen how they are respectively situated. A boor, upon discovering water on a sufficient quantity of unoccupied land, forwards through the secretary of his district what he terms a "request" for a place—that is, a memorial, asking for a grant of 6,000 acres; and he will hardly pay the expense of measurement for less than 4,000 acres. His memorial is referred for report to the Landdrost; and if there exists no real local objection, and the applicant prevents competition by securing the favour of that powerful officer, the land is granted as a matter of It is inspected and measured at an expense of from 300 to 600 rix-dollars. The annual quit-rent is fixed at the inspection, and is generally from thirty to fifty rix-dollars, perhaps about one per cent. upon the estimated value. If it happens to afford water sufficient for his own use, and a small spot for cultivation, he perhaps resides on it with two or three slaves or Hottentots; but although his tenure requires residence and cultivation, he is not


in reality obliged to conform to it. The occupation is considered sufficient for all the purposes of Government, if he pays his quitrent, and is enabled, by removing his cattle to it for part of the year, to keep a greater stock, and pay a larger opgaaf.

To become entitled to an equal extent, an English settler must have brought out (at the expense of Government, it is true) fifty-nine servants; he must lave paid for each of them a deposit of 10%., amounting to the full value of his land; he must employ and maintain them for three years, unless assisted by Government, at an expense of at least six times the value of his land; and he must have gone to all this expense before he knows upon what terms he is to possess it at last. He is only certain that his quit-rent shall not exceed 120l., twenty-five per cent. upon the value of his land, or about twenty-five times the sum paid by the neighbouring boors; and the sole advantage which the settler possesses over the boor, in the mode of his location, is, that the expense of measurement is defrayed by Government.' 1

The second cause of the partial failure of the Albany Settlement was the fact that the wrong sort of emigrants were sent out. The artisans were not only unsuitable as being townsmen, and therefore unaccustomed to country pursuits, but these emigrants of the working class, even when they were agricultural labourers, had so little capital that they could only take up allotments of 100 acres, and these small allotments could not be properly worked. In point of fact the profits arising from such small holdings were less than the wages which the immigrants could command, and consequently these working-class settlers gave up their farms when once the Government ceased to issue rations. As showing the error of placing immigrants on the land without sufficient capital, Thompson remarks that the fairest qualification to entitle individuals to grants of land' is 'the possession of adequate means,' adding that nine-tenths of the original Albany settlers failed to satisfy the test. At the same time, the few settlers possessing adequate means were prevented from benefiting by their capital through the limitation of the area of their holdings to 500 acres, an extent which was too small for profitable farming. One thing more is to be noticed. In spite of mistaken methods, and in spite of physical disasters which no one could foresee or prevent, the Albany settlers' muddled through.' Seven

1 Quoted by Thompson from a paper 'drawn up by a gentleman of talent and experience, residing in the district,' p. 337.

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